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Fernando Collor de Mello's formal resignation on Dec. 29 refocused domestic and international
attention on the future economic policies of Brazil's new president, Itamar Franco, who will serve
out the remaining two years of Collor's presidential term. Franco vowed to continue Collor's efforts
to modernize the economy. But recent, controversial statements by Franco raised concern in the
business community that the new president will roll back free-market reforms and increase state
intervention in the economy. Postponement of the privatization program in December combined
with a stated government strategy to fuel economic reactivation through public spending reinforced
private sector criticism. Local and foreign economists fear Franco's policies could prolong Brazil's
economic recession by aggravating inflation and discouraging private investment. Since taking
office in October 1992, Franco has been widely criticized for a lackluster response to Brazil's
economic problems. The then-interim president resisted launching any major policy initiatives to
await the outcome of impeachment proceedings against Collor, scheduled for the end of December.
In fact, on Nov. 30, Franco ordered his Finance and Planning Ministers to postpone announcement
of a new economic reactivation plan drawn up by those ministries in November until after the
impeachment hearings. The only significant economic initiative taken by Franco was a tax reform
package sent to congress on Nov. 5, where it remains stalled awaiting legislative approval (see
Chronicle 11/19/92). With Collor's formal resignation, Franco's economic program has risen to the
top of Brazil's agenda. So far, the new president has stressed a commitment to carry forward his
predecessor's program of free-market reforms. For example, Franco pledged to honor agreements
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other foreign creditors to reduce government
bureaucracy and state intervention in the economy and meet all debt obligations. But a series of
contradictory statements by Franco have generated skepticism about his commitment to structural
adjustment, especially his frequent public criticism of foreign intervention in the economy and his
adamant refusal to accept the social consequences of modernization. "We all want to modernize
our country, and we will modernize, but not by impoverishing the middle class and aggravating
the sacrifice of the workers," said Franco at his inaugural address on Dec. 30. In other statements,
he specifically rejected the imposition of foreign economic models: "Brazil needs to forget a little
about New York, Manhattan, and think about its slums, its suffering people...What is modernity ?
Is it defending foreign interests or defending the interests of our country ?" In addition to such
controversial statements, the general economic guidelines outlined by the government in late
December indicate Franco will rely on greater state spending to offset the social effects of the
economic crisis. In contrast to the Collor administration's emphasis on strict monetary and fiscal
policies to lower inflation, Franco says his government will concentrate on programs that spur
economic growth and create jobs, making inflation control a secondary objective. Specifically,
the government will launch broad public works especially highway construction plus a massive,
low- cost housing development scheme worth US$1.5 billion. According to Planning Minister
Paulo Haddad, the government will draw heavily on foreign funding to finance those programs.
Government spokespersons have vowed to lower interest rates to encourage investment. Officials
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also say they will open negotiations with industrial, commercial and agricultural organizations to
forge specific accords with each of those sectors to increase production, offering tax breaks and
other incentives. According to Haddad, the government aims to generate at least 2 million new jobs
per year through public investment and private sector incentives. But rather than spur economic
reactivation, most local economists and opposition politicians warned that the government's
planned policies will instead fuel inflation, in turn discouraging investment and prolonging the
recession. Inflation is already running at about 25% per month, with a cumulative 1,175% rise in
the consumer price index for 1992. The government hopes to offset the planned increase in public
spending through its tax reform, proposed in November. But opposition politicians argue the tax
package itself will provoke inflation, and in the short term, any increase in state investment is
bound to aggravate the fiscal deficit, presently estimated at about US$18 billion, or 4% of GDP.
In addition, the government will fight an uphill battle to win legislative backing for new taxes.
Franco planned to open negotiations with the country's political parties on Jan. 8 to forge a pact
over future government policies. But most congressional deputies favor cuts in public spending
over an increase in state revenue, and Franco's populist rhetoric is rapidly eroding his negotiating
credibility. "Franco is a 1950's populist nationalist who is lost in the 1990's," said Roberto Campos, a
conservative senator from the Partido Democratico Social, which participated in a pro- government
alliance in congress during Collor's administration. Moreover, Franco's Dec. 15 decision to freeze
the government's privatization program for four months to revise the laws regulating the sale
of state enterprises further hurt his credibility. Although Franco has expressed commitment to
privatization, he argues that benefits have been minimal, since most corporations have bought
government entities with treasury bonds in debt-equity swaps. Thus, the government has earned
little hard cash, despite the sale of 10 public businesses worth about US$4 billion. As a result, Franco
called for an increase in the percentage of stock that must be bought in cash. He also proposed an
increase in the amount of stock set aside for employees of privatized companies, which is presently
limited to 10%. Nevertheless, most Brazilian business associations and foreign banks fear Franco
is attempting to roll back privatization altogether, or at least postpone the program indefinitely
during his presidency. In fact, the program's suspension caused the first major crisis in Franco's
cabinet the resignation of Finance Minister Gustavo Krause on Dec. 16. Krause's resignation
spurred harsh criticism of Franco by the business community. In an editorial the following day,
the conservative daily Folha de Sao Paulo said: "A 1950's style populist nationalism has shown
its true face, one with historic scorn for the modernization of the economy...There is a struggle
between deplorable caricatures of the left and right within the Franco government." According to
Agence France-Presse, the managing director of the Chase Manhattan Bank in Brazil, Joseph Boyle,
and the vice president of the Dutch NMB Bank, Fernando Haalen, said the business community
fears an end to economic modernization under Franco. Franco's nationalist stand is also shaking
the government's international credibility. "Mr. Franco hasn't gotten a grip on the office in three
months of interim rule and has not grasped the urgency of economic reform," the New York Times
said in a Dec. 31 editorial. "Neither the poor nor the rich can prosper without continued economic
reform. Brazil's political leaders, who have just shown such skill at transferring power (from Collor
to Franco), need to tackle economic challenges with the same deftness and determination." The
privatization controversy and other economic policies may block efforts to negotiate a new accord
with the IMF and could disrupt a new debt-reduction accord negotiated last July with Brazil's
foreign commercial creditors. The Collor administration had negotiated a standby agreement
with the IMF in January 1992, but the accord was suspended in mid-year due to the government's
failure to meet its commitments. On Dec. 1, Franco announced the introduction of a new "social
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 058284
ISSN: 1060-4189

criteria" in determining price hikes on electricity and other public utilities, which particularly
complicated any future talks with the IMF. Under last year's standby agreement, the Collor
government agreed to readjust electric tariffs periodically at rates above monthly inflation, with at
least a 10% jump in the real price of electricity by year-end. But under Franco's new "social criteria,"
all low-income households that consume less than 30 kilowatts per month would be exempt from
rate increases, while higher tariffs would be imposed on a sliding scale on upper income groups
and businesses to subsidize the cost of energy for the poor. In a similar decision, Franco rejected
pegging gasoline price hikes to monthly inflation as proposed by former Finance Minister Krause,
contributing to his decision to resign. Despite his local and foreign critics, the new president
still wields significant political clout among the electorate, which could push the opposition into
concessions when negotiating economic policy. According to the New York Times, recent polls
show Franco's popularity is growing in Brazil, with an approval rating of 60% in December, up
from 54% in November. (Sources: Notimex, 12/15/92; Deutsch Press Agentur, 12/16/92; Associated
Press, 12/16/92; New York Times, 12/17/92, 12/30/92, 12/31/92; Wall Street Journal, 12/31/92; Agence
France-Presse, 11/20/92, 11/22/92, 12/01/92, 12/03/92, 12/10/92, 12/15/92, 12/16/92, 12/18/92, 12/29/92,
12/31/92; Spanish news service EFE, 11/23/92, 11/30/92, 12/16/92, 12/31/92, 01/01/93)
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